Türkiye in NATO: Membership, Defense Industry and the Drone Factor

Why It Matters

Türkiye is one of NATO's longest-standing members and its only member that straddles Europe, the Black Sea, the Middle East and the Caucasus. It controls the Bosporus and Dardanelles, hosts allied radar and air assets, and fields one of the alliance's largest armed forces. At the same time, its purchase of Russian S-400 systems, its drawn-out handling of Sweden's membership and its rapidly growing domestic arms industry have made it both a pillar and a recurring point of friction inside the alliance.

Background

Accession and the Cold War

Türkiye and Greece formally joined NATO on 18 February 1952, in the alliance's first enlargement after its 1949 founding. Ankara's candidacy was strengthened by its dispatch of a brigade to the UN Command in the Korean War (1950-1953) and by Soviet pressure on the Turkish Straits and eastern provinces after 1945. During the Cold War, Türkiye anchored NATO's southeastern flank, bordering the Soviet Union and Bulgaria. US Jupiter missiles were stationed on Turkish soil in the early 1960s and withdrawn after the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.

The relationship has not been frictionless. After Türkiye's 1974 intervention in Cyprus, the US Congress imposed an arms embargo (1975-1978), which Turkish officials still cite as a lesson in the risks of dependence on a single supplier. For the Cyprus dimension, see Cyprus and the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee.

What Türkiye Contributes

• Incirlik Air Base (near Adana): Hosts US Air Force units and has supported NATO and coalition operations, including against DAESH (ISIS). It is widely reported, though not officially confirmed by NATO, to store US nuclear weapons under NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements.
• Kürecik radar: An early-warning radar in Malatya province, part of NATO's ballistic missile defense architecture agreed at the 2010 Lisbon Summit and operational from 2012.
• Allied Land Command (LANDCOM), Izmir: NATO's land forces headquarters, established in 2012.
• Troops and missions: Türkiye has contributed to the Balkans (including KFOR), Afghanistan (ISAF and Resolute Support, including the Kabul airport effort) and NATO maritime activity in the Aegean and Mediterranean.
• Black Sea and the Straits: Under the 1936 Montreux Convention, Türkiye regulates warship passage. In February 2022 it declared the Russia-Ukraine war a 'war' under the convention and restricted passage of belligerents' warships. In January 2024 Türkiye, Bulgaria and Romania agreed to a joint Black Sea mine countermeasures group. See the Montreux Convention guide.
• Article 4 consultations: Türkiye requested consultations under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty in 2012, 2015 and 2020 over Syria-related security incidents. Patriot batteries from several allies were deployed in southern Türkiye from 2013.

Key Timeline

Date	Event
1952-02-18	Türkiye and Greece join NATO
1975-1978	US arms embargo after the 1974 Cyprus operation
2012	Kürecik radar operational; LANDCOM opens in Izmir
2017-12	Türkiye signs S-400 contract with Russia
2019-07	S-400 deliveries begin; US removes Türkiye from the F-35 program
2020-12-14	US imposes CAATSA Section 231 sanctions on Türkiye's Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB)
2022-05-18	Sweden and Finland apply to join NATO
2022-06-28	Türkiye, Sweden and Finland sign a trilateral memorandum at the Madrid Summit
2023-04-04	Finland becomes the 31st member after Türkiye's ratification
2024-01-23	Turkish parliament (TBMM) approves Sweden's accession protocol
2024-03-07	Sweden becomes the 32nd member

The S-400, F-35 and CAATSA Dispute

Türkiye signed a contract for the Russian S-400 system in December 2017 and took first deliveries in July 2019. Türkiye had been a partner in the F-35 program, producing components and planning to buy around 100 aircraft. The United States argued that operating the S-400 alongside the F-35 risked exposing the aircraft's stealth characteristics and that the system could not be integrated into NATO's air defense network. Washington removed Türkiye from the program in 2019, and in December 2020 applied sanctions under the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), including an export-license ban and asset freezes on SSB officials.

The dispute eased only partially. In January 2024 the US State Department notified Congress of a possible sale of 40 new F-16 Block 70 aircraft and modernization kits for about 79 existing jets, worth roughly $23 billion, shortly after Türkiye's parliament approved Sweden's accession. Türkiye has also explored European options such as the Eurofighter Typhoon. The S-400 and CAATSA questions remain formally unresolved.

The Sweden and Finland Episode

After both Nordic states applied in May 2022, Türkiye withheld consent, citing what it described as the tolerance of PKK/YPG- and FETÖ-linked activity in Sweden and Finland and the arms-export restrictions several allies had imposed after Türkiye's 2019 Operation Peace Spring. (The PKK is designated a terrorist organization by Türkiye, the United States, the EU and NATO members; see PKK/YPG, DAESH and FETÖ explained.) The June 2022 trilateral memorandum committed the three states to cooperate on counter-terrorism and lift arms restrictions. Sweden amended its constitution and tightened terrorism legislation in 2023. Finland joined in April 2023; Sweden followed in March 2024 after Türkiye and then Hungary completed ratification.

The Domestic Defense Industry

The 1975 embargo and later supply restrictions pushed Türkiye to build its own industrial base. Since the 2010s, state-linked and private firms, including Aselsan (electronics), Roketsan (missiles), TUSAŞ/TAI (aerospace), STM, MKE and the private company Baykar, have expanded sharply. Key milestones:

• UAVs: The Bayraktar TB2 armed drone, used by Türkiye in Syria, Libya and the Caucasus and by Ukraine from 2022, has been exported to dozens of countries. Larger platforms include the Akıncı and the jet-powered Kızılelma.
• Naval systems: The MILGEM corvette program, Hisar-class offshore patrol vessels and the amphibious assault ship TCG Anadolu, commissioned in 2023 and used as a platform for drones.
• Air systems: The Hürjet jet trainer and the KAAN fifth-generation fighter, which made its first flight on 21 February 2024. Engines remain a dependency while a domestic engine is developed.
• Air defense: The multi-layered 'Steel Dome' (Çelik Kubbe) program.
• Exports: The Presidency of Defense Industries reported defense and aerospace exports above $7 billion in 2024. Baykar announced a joint venture with Italy's Leonardo in 2025, a sign of growing integration with European industry.

Key Players & Positions

United States

Washington's official line, expressed through the State Department and in the CAATSA statement of December 2020, is that Türkiye is a valued ally but that the S-400 is incompatible with NATO air defense and the F-35 and triggers mandatory sanctions. The US executive branch has since supported F-16 sales, while parts of Congress have conditioned approvals on Türkiye's conduct toward Greece and on Sweden's accession.

Greece

Athens, a NATO member since the same day as Türkiye, opposes arms transfers that it believes could be used in the Aegean. Greek leaders have raised concerns about Turkish overflights, the 1995 TBMM authorization on a possible casus belli over territorial waters, and exploration activity in disputed maritime zones. Greece has itself purchased Rafale fighters and signed to buy F-35s. In recent years both governments have sought calmer relations through high-level dialogue. See the Eastern Mediterranean maritime guide.

EU Members

Views diverge. France's president described NATO as experiencing 'brain death' in 2019 in part over Türkiye's Syria operation, and a June 2020 naval incident involving a French frigate and Turkish vessels off Libya led to a NATO inquiry. Germany and other states tightened arms-export policies in 2019, partly relaxed later. The Nordic and Baltic states pressed for rapid enlargement but also engaged Ankara's concerns. Many EU capitals value Türkiye's migration cooperation, Black Sea role and growing industrial capacity, while some question its alignment with EU foreign policy.

NATO's Own Documents

• The Washington Treaty (1949) provides in Article 5 for collective defense and in Article 3 for developing individual and collective capacity to resist attack, language Turkish officials cite for domestic industrial investment.
• The 2022 Strategic Concept (Madrid) calls terrorism the most direct asymmetric threat to allies' security and identifies the Black Sea as strategically important.
• Summit declarations from Vilnius (2023), Washington (2024) and The Hague (2025) welcomed Sweden and Finland, stressed support for Ukraine and set a new spending commitment of 5% of GDP (3.5% core defense plus 1.5% related spending) by 2035. Türkiye is due to host the 2026 summit in Ankara.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

The points below summarize official Turkish policy as expressed by the Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Presidency and Turkish statements at NATO summits. Ankara's assessments are presented as its own arguments.

• Reliable ally with distinctive contributions. The MFA's NATO pages describe Türkiye as a committed ally since 1952, citing its participation in Korea, the Balkans and Afghanistan, its hosting of Kürecik and LANDCOM, and its defense of NATO's southern border. Ankara argues that these contributions justify a full voice in alliance decision-making.
• S-400 as a sovereign, last-resort choice. Turkish officials, including the Presidency and MFA, say Türkiye turned to Russia only after failing to obtain a Patriot system on acceptable terms, and that the purchase is not directed against NATO. Ankara has proposed a joint technical working group and calls CAATSA sanctions on an allied state unjust and counterproductive. Ankara has also said it wants to return to the F-35 program.
• Security concerns must count in enlargement. Statements by President Erdoğan and the MFA around the Madrid and Vilnius summits framed the Sweden and Finland process as a matter of 'indivisible security': allies should not provide a safe haven to organizations that Türkiye and NATO's own documents treat as terrorist threats. Ankara maintains that it acted within NATO's consensus rules and approved membership once commitments were met.
• Defense autonomy complements NATO. Presidency and SSB statements present the domestic industry as a response to past embargoes and a way to strengthen allied capabilities, citing the Madrid Strategic Concept and Article 3 of the Washington Treaty. Ankara points to drone exports to allies and the Leonardo-Baykar partnership as evidence of the benefits for the wider alliance.
• Burden sharing should be measured broadly. Turkish officials argue that assessments should account not just for the 2% and 5% spending metrics but also for troop strength, border-defense costs, Black Sea stewardship under Montreux, and the costs of hosting millions of refugees. See Türkiye, Syria and Refugees.

Legal and historical basis: the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty and Türkiye's 1952 accession protocol; the 1936 Montreux Convention on the Straits; Article 51 of the UN Charter on self-defense, which Ankara cites for cross-border counter-terrorism operations; and the 1974-1978 embargo experience that shapes its procurement logic.

Source Comparison

Issue	Western and international framing	Turkish primary-source framing
S-400	Interoperability and security risk; Russia gains leverage	Sovereign procurement after Patriot talks failed; not aimed at NATO
CAATSA	Legally mandatory consequence	Unjust sanction against an ally; dialogue preferred
Sweden and Finland	Ankara 'blocked' or delayed enlargement	Ankara raised legitimate counter-terrorism concerns and secured commitments
Drones	Game-changing battlefield tool; export-control questions	Product of indigenous capability; contribution to allied security
Burden sharing	Focus on spending percentages and alignment	Include troops, geography, refugees and Black Sea responsibilities

When reading coverage, check whether a source cites NATO summit declarations, US State Department notices, TBMM records or Presidency and MFA statements directly. The Editorial Principles and Primary Source Standards explain how Interstate Journal weighs such sources, and the Fact Check hub addresses common claims.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• CAATSA: US law of 2017 requiring sanctions on significant transactions with Russia's defense sector; Section 231 was applied to Türkiye in 2020.
• S-400: Russian long-range surface-to-air missile system.
• Article 4 and Article 5: Article 4 allows any ally to request consultations when its security is threatened; Article 5 is the collective-defense clause.
• Montreux Convention: 1936 treaty governing passage through the Bosporus and Dardanelles; see the plain-language guide.
• KAAN: Türkiye's indigenous fifth-generation fighter, formerly TF-X.
• Related reading: UN Security Council Reform, About Interstate Journal and the Interstate Journal home page.

Interstate Journal presents global affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources.

By the Interstate Journal Editorial Team.

Cross-Publication Dossiers & Sister Desk Perspectives

For complementary primary-source analysis across our specialist editorial network, consult:

• The Nations Dialogue: Türkiye's Defense Industry: How an 80% Indigenous Capability Was Built — How Türkiye built a defense industry it says is about 80% domestic: Bayraktar TB2, KAAN, TCG Anadolu, embargo debates, NATO role and source comparison.
• Monitor of Nations: Türkiye's Defense Industry: How Domestic Production Reached About 80% and What It Means — How Türkiye's defense industry reached about 80% domestic production: Bayraktar TB2, KAAN, TCG Anadolu, air defense, embargo debates and strategic autonomy.
• Diplomacy Arena: Türkiye's Defense Industry: How It Reached About 80% Domestic Production — How Türkiye's defense industry reached an official ~80% domestic production rate: UAVs, KAAN, MİLGEM, missiles, NATO context, exports and critiques.