Black Sea Grain Initiative: How Türkiye Helped Broker the Deal

Why It Matters

The Black Sea Grain Initiative was brokered by Türkiye and the United Nations and signed in Istanbul on 22 July 2022. It allowed Ukrainian grain and foodstuffs to leave three Ukrainian ports under a monitored sea corridor, and it lowered a global food-security risk during the first year of the full-scale war. Russia stopped participating on 17 July 2023, and the central question today is whether the conditions that made the deal possible can be recreated.

Background

The blockade and the food-price shock

Before February 2022, Ukraine was one of the world's largest exporters of corn, wheat and sunflower oil, and Russia and Ukraine together supplied close to a third of globally traded wheat by commonly cited estimates. After the invasion, Ukrainian seaports were effectively closed by naval activity and sea mines. The UN cited roughly 20 million tonnes of grain as stuck in Ukraine in mid-2022. Food prices, tracked by the FAO Food Price Index, reached record highs in March 2022, and import-dependent countries in the Middle East, East Africa and South Asia were most exposed.

How the deal was negotiated

UN Secretary-General António Guterres proposed a package in spring 2022 covering both Ukrainian grain exports and Russian food and fertiliser exports. UN officials, notably UNCTAD's Rebeca Grynspan and OCHA's Martin Griffiths, worked on the details. Türkiye supplied the venue, the political channel to both capitals and the naval capacity to host inspections.

Key steps included:

• March 2022: Türkiye hosted a Russia–Ukraine foreign ministers' meeting at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum and a delegation-level round of talks in Istanbul later that month.
• June 2022: Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov visited Ankara, where grain corridors were on the agenda.
• 13 July 2022: Military delegations from Türkiye, Russia, Ukraine and the UN met in Istanbul to settle technical arrangements.
• 22 July 2022: The agreements were signed at Dolmabahçe Palace in Istanbul in the presence of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Secretary-General Guterres.

What was actually signed

There was no single trilateral document. The package consisted of:

1. An Initiative on the safe transportation of grain and foodstuffs from Ukrainian ports, concluded in parallel between Türkiye, the UN and Russia, and between Türkiye, the UN and Ukraine.
2. A separate Memorandum of Understanding between Russia and the UN Secretariat on facilitating Russian food and fertiliser exports to world markets.

This structure mattered because Russia and Ukraine did not sign a common text with each other. Each committed to the arrangement through Türkiye and the UN.

The Initiative covered the ports of Odesa, Chornomorsk and Pivdennyi (Yuzhne). Commercial vessels moved along an agreed maritime humanitarian corridor and agreed not to be targeted. Ships were inspected to confirm they carried only food and fertiliser on the way out and no cargo other than that on return, and inspections were carried out by joint teams in Turkish waters near Istanbul.

How the Joint Coordination Centre worked

The Joint Coordination Centre (JCC) opened in Istanbul on 27 July 2022. It was staffed by officials from Türkiye, Russia, Ukraine and the UN. The JCC approved vessel registration and sailing plans, coordinated Joint Inspection Teams and published data on voyages. The first ship under the scheme, the Razoni, left Odesa on 1 August 2022. Because inspection capacity became a bottleneck, the length of the queue of ships waiting off Istanbul became the most-watched indicator of whether the system worked.

Exports achieved

The UN reported that, by the time the arrangement ended, roughly 33 million tonnes of grain and other foodstuffs had been moved on close to 1,000 voyages. Corn was the largest single commodity, followed by wheat. The World Food Programme reported buying about 725,000 tonnes of Ukrainian wheat shipped under the deal for humanitarian operations in places such as Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Yemen. Critics, including Russia, noted that most cargo went to middle- and high-income countries; UN officials replied that increased global supply helped lower prices for everyone.

Date	Event
22 July 2022	Agreements signed in Istanbul
1 August 2022	First vessel leaves Odesa
29 Oct–2 Nov 2022	Russia suspends, then resumes participation after contacts with Türkiye and the UN
Nov 2022	Extended for 120 days
March 2023	Extended again; Russia stated 60 days, while Ukraine and the UN said 120
May 2023	Extended for two months, to 17 July 2023
17 July 2023	Russia declares it will not extend; deal lapses

Why Russia withdrew in July 2023

Moscow's stated reason was that the second half of the package had not been implemented. Russian officials, including Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov and the Foreign Ministry, said that the obstacles to Russian exports of grain and fertiliser persisted: payment channels (in particular the status of the Russian Agricultural Bank, Rosselkhozbank, which had been cut off from SWIFT), insurance and port access, supplies of agricultural machinery, and the stalled Togliatti–Odesa ammonia pipeline. Russia also complained that the cargoes did not reach the poorest countries in the proportions it expected.

Ukraine, the UN and the EU rejected the premise. They said that EU and US sanctions explicitly exempt Russian food and fertiliser, that Russian grain exports reached record or near-record levels in 2022–23 and that the Russian demands were really a request for sanctions relief. The UN also said it had made efforts to resolve the Rosselkhozbank and other issues, and Guterres sent proposals to Moscow shortly before the deadline.

Two days after the lapse, Russia's Defence Ministry announced that vessels heading to Ukrainian ports could be treated as potential carriers of military cargo. Strikes on Odesa and Danube port infrastructure followed in July and August 2023.

Later efforts

• Ukraine's own corridor: From August 2023, Ukraine opened a temporary corridor along its western Black Sea coast, without the JCC or inspections in Istanbul. Ukrainian authorities report that substantial export volumes have resumed, though shipping insurance costs are higher.
• Erdoğan–Putin talks: On 4 September 2023 in Sochi, Erdoğan pressed Putin to return to the deal. Putin said Russia could return once its own part was fulfilled.
• Black Sea security: In January 2024, Türkiye, Bulgaria and Romania signed an agreement on mine countermeasures in the Black Sea.
• 2025 talks: In March 2025, US-mediated talks in Riyadh produced statements on a Black Sea maritime ceasefire. The Kremlin made implementation conditional on the reconnection of Rosselkhozbank to the international payments system. Türkiye also hosted direct Russia–Ukraine talks in Istanbul in May and June 2025, which produced prisoner exchanges rather than a maritime agreement.

Key Players & Positions

Ukraine. President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukrainian officials argued that the initiative restored a vital export route and was a test of whether Russia would respect a humanitarian agreement. After July 2023 Kyiv said it would keep shipping through its own corridor and treated Russian attacks on port infrastructure as targeting global food security.

Russia. According to the Russian Foreign Ministry and the Kremlin, Russia fulfilled its part of the Black Sea component, but the commitments to it under the UN memorandum were not delivered. Moscow says it would return immediately if those commitments were met, and it has also cited concerns about the use of the corridor for military purposes.

United Nations. The UN Secretary-General described the deal as a humanitarian lifeline, and UN officials said the Initiative and the memorandum were linked in practice. After the withdrawal, the UN expressed regret and said it would continue to work toward facilitating both Ukrainian and Russian exports.

European Union. EU officials, including the High Representative and the Commission, condemned Russia's withdrawal and described it as using food as a weapon. The EU points out that its sanctions do not cover Russian agricultural exports and that its own Solidarity Lanes, set up in May 2022 for land and river routes, carried large volumes of Ukrainian grain. The scale of those flows caused trade disputes with some neighbouring member states in 2023.

Could It Be Revived?

Technically yes, because the JCC model and the inspection procedures are well understood and Türkiye has stated its readiness to host them again. Politically, revival hinges on three things: how Russia's agricultural payments and banking access are handled, whether both sides accept credible guarantees against attacks on ships and ports, and whether the wider war moves toward a ceasefire. Without movement on these, a revival is unlikely. A Black Sea maritime arrangement could also be reached as part of a broader ceasefire package rather than as a standalone grain deal.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

The following points summarise Ankara's stated position, based on statements by the Presidency, the Directorate of Communications and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA).

• Neutral facilitator with channels to both sides. According to the Presidency, Erdoğan has repeatedly said that Türkiye maintains dialogue with both Moscow and Kyiv and is therefore able to host talks, which it did in March 2022, July 2022 and again in 2025. Ankara argues that this access is what made the Istanbul agreements possible.
• Support for Ukraine's territorial integrity alongside non-participation in sanctions. The MFA states that Türkiye supports Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders and does not recognise Russia's annexation of Crimea. It has not joined Western sanctions on Russia, and says that keeping communication channels open is necessary for any mediation.
• Commitment to reviving the initiative. Following Russia's withdrawal, Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said that Türkiye would continue working for the resumption of grain exports and would present new proposals to the parties. Ankara links the issue to humanitarian needs in developing countries and to wider food security.
• Legal basis in Black Sea governance. Türkiye's role as the holder of the Bosporus and Dardanelles gives it a particular stake in Black Sea shipping. Under the 1936 Montreux Convention, Ankara announced in late February 2022 that it would restrict the passage of warships of belligerent states through the Straits, while commercial navigation continued. Ankara regards this balanced approach as part of what kept the Straits open to civilian trade. See the Montreux Convention guide for details.
• A broader mediation record. Ankara points to the Istanbul talks, prisoner exchanges and the grain deal as evidence that diplomacy can achieve concrete results, and it also uses the case in its argument for a larger role for middle powers in UN decision-making (see UN Security Council Reform).

Türkiye is also a NATO member, which Ankara says complements, rather than conflicts with, its mediation role; see Türkiye in NATO.

Source Comparison

Question	UN / EU sources	Russian sources	Ukrainian sources	Turkish sources
Who brokered it?	UN and Türkiye jointly	Türkiye and UN as guarantors	Türkiye and UN as mediators	Türkiye and UN with both parties
Why did it end?	Russia chose not to extend	Russian-side commitments unmet	Russia used the deal as leverage	Parties should resolve outstanding issues; Ankara wants a resumption
Did it work?	Yes; about 33 million tonnes shipped	Mostly benefited wealthier importers	Yes; vital for food security and revenue	Yes; a concrete result of diplomacy
Can it be revived?	Yes, if Russia returns	Yes, if the memorandum is implemented	Yes, but Ukraine will use its own corridor	Yes; Ankara is ready to host and propose

When reading coverage, check whether a source treats the grain agreement and the Russia–UN memorandum as separate or linked. Much of the disagreement over why the deal ended comes from that difference. For guidance on how we handle such sources, see Editorial Principles and Primary Source Standards and Fact Check: Common Claims About Türkiye in International Media.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Joint Coordination Centre (JCC): The Istanbul body with Turkish, Russian, Ukrainian and UN staff that coordinated vessel movements and inspections.
• Joint Inspection Team: Inspectors from the four parties who checked ships in Turkish waters.
• Maritime humanitarian corridor: The agreed sea route for ships moving to and from Ukraine's three ports.
• Memorandum of Understanding (MoU): The separate Russia–UN text on Russian food and fertiliser exports.
• Solidarity Lanes: The EU's land and river export routes for Ukrainian goods.
• Montreux Convention: The 1936 treaty governing passage through the Turkish Straits; see the plain-language guide.

For more context, see Interstate Journal: Diplomacy, Treaties, Borders and Alliances Explained and About Interstate Journal.

Interstate Journal presents global affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources. Author: Interstate Journal Editorial Team.

Cross-Publication Dossiers & Sister Desk Perspectives

For complementary primary-source analysis across our specialist editorial network, consult:

• Horizon of Nations: Türkiye's Mediation Record: Black Sea Grain Initiative, Istanbul Talks and Humanitarian Diplomacy — How Türkiye's mediation shaped the Black Sea Grain Initiative, Istanbul talks, prisoner swaps and Gaza diplomacy, with UN, Russian, Ukrainian and Western views.
• Region Scope: Black Sea Grain Initiative and Türkiye's Russia–Ukraine Mediation: What Happened and Why — How the Black Sea Grain Initiative came about, who brokered it, what Türkiye's mediation role was, and where Russia–Ukraine talks stand after the deal lapsed.
• Borders & Blocs: Türkiye's Mediation in the Russia–Ukraine War and the Black Sea Grain Initiative — Türkiye mediation in the Russia–Ukraine war explained: Antalya and Istanbul talks, Black Sea Grain Initiative, prisoner swaps, why it ended and its limits.