Is the Gaza War 'Ecocide'? What International Law, the UNEP Assessment and Erdoğan's COP31 Speech Actually Say

Why It Matters

Ecocide is not a codified crime in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, so calling the war in Gaza 'ecocide' is a political characterization, not a legal finding. Existing rules already restrict severe environmental harm in war, and UNEP's 2025 post-conflict assessment documented extensive damage to Gaza's land, crops and water systems.

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's remarks at COP31 in Antalya placed a legal-humanitarian argument on the climate agenda. The legal weight of the label itself remains contested among states, scholars and advocacy groups.

Background

The term 'ecocide' has no treaty definition in the Rome Statute. Additional Protocol I (1977) Articles 35(3) and 55, the ENMOD Convention (1976) and Rome Statute Article 8(2)(b)(iv) set a high threshold of 'widespread, long-term and severe' environmental damage, and the UN International Law Commission's 2022 Draft Principles restate protections without creating a new crime.

What 'ecocide' means and where the term comes from

The word was used in 1970s debates over the herbicide Agent Orange in the Vietnam War. Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme is often cited as using the term at the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm. In 1996 the International Law Commission included 'widespread, long-term and severe' environmental damage in its Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind as a war crime, but the Code did not create a separate offence of ecocide.

In 2021 an Independent Expert Panel convened by the Stop Ecocide Foundation proposed a legal definition covering unlawful or wanton acts committed with knowledge of a substantial likelihood of severe, widespread or long-term environmental damage. This is a civil-society-convened body, not a UN organ, and no treaty body has adopted its definition. In 2024 Vanuatu submitted a proposal to amend the Rome Statute to add ecocide, which would have to proceed under the amendment procedure in Article 121.

Campaigns also cite national and regional measures, including criminal-law provisions and the revised EU Environmental Crime Directive adopted in 2024. This article does not rely on them for its legal conclusions. Readers should check current official texts in their own jurisdictions before drawing conclusions.

Existing law on environmental harm in war

Instrument	Status	Threshold or core rule	Practical limit
Additional Protocol I, Articles 35(3) and 55 (1977)	Binding on states parties; Israel has signed but not ratified	Prohibits methods of warfare expected to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment	Cumulative threshold, set high
ENMOD Convention (1976)	Binding on states parties	Bans hostile use of environmental modification with widespread, long-lasting or severe effects	Concerns deliberate modification of nature as a weapon, not incidental damage
Rome Statute, Article 8(2)(b)(iv)	Binding on states parties; Israel and Türkiye are not parties	Intentionally launching an attack knowing it will cause widespread, long-term and severe environmental damage clearly excessive relative to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated	Requires proof of knowledge, scale and excessiveness before a competent court
ICRC Customary IHL Study (2005), Rules 43 to 45	Customary law, as assessed by the ICRC	Restricts methods and means causing severe environmental damage and requires care to protect the environment	Scope of customary rules is debated
ILC Draft Principles on Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts (2022)	Non-binding guidance	General principles for protecting the environment before, during and after armed conflict	Not a treaty and not a court ruling

The proportionality test asks whether expected civilian harm, including environmental harm, would be clearly excessive compared with the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. Assessing it requires facts about the attack, precautions taken and the military objective, which a broad environmental report cannot supply by itself.

Is Gaza 'ecocide' under international law today?

No tribunal has ruled that the conflict in Gaza constitutes ecocide, and the term is not an offence in force under the Rome Statute. Lawyers can test specific incidents against existing rules, including whether damage met the 'widespread, long-term and severe' threshold and whether it was clearly excessive. Those questions turn on evidence of extent, duration and military purpose.

Where the term is used as a legal charge, the mental element matters. The dolus specialis required for genocide under the 1948 Genocide Convention is a separate and stricter standard, and should not be confused with the knowledge and proportionality elements of environmental war crimes.

What the UNEP assessment found and what it cannot show

The UNEP post-conflict assessment of the conflict's environmental impact in Gaza, published in 2025, documented damage to cropland and other land, water and sanitation systems, waste, rubble and contamination. Korea Times reporting of Erdoğan's speech refers to the same report's findings on crops and land. Readers should consult the UNEP document itself for figures; this article does not restate statistics it has not verified in the text.

According to UNEP's methodology as publicly described, the work relied largely on remote sensing and desk review. Such methods can show changes in land cover and infrastructure, but they cannot establish the cause, intent or legal character of each incident. The report therefore documents conditions; it is not a criminal finding.

Related legal proceedings

• ICJ advisory opinion (19 July 2024): The International Court of Justice addressed the legal consequences of Israel's policies and practices in the occupied Palestinian territory. It did not rule on ecocide.
• South Africa v. Israel (ICJ, filed 29 December 2023): This case concerns alleged violations of the 1948 Genocide Convention. It is not an environmental-damage case.
• ICC arrest warrants (21 November 2024): The Court issued warrants for Israeli leaders and a Hamas figure concerning alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity. Israel disputes the Court's jurisdiction, and the warrants do not address ecocide.

Key Players & Positions

Israel's Foreign Ministry responded to Erdoğan's remarks by accusing him of using the summit to promote anti-Israel claims, while Israel's general legal position holds that its operations are self-defense after 7 October 2023. UN bodies have published environmental and humanitarian assessments, and legal scholars and NGOs divide on whether the Rome Statute threshold is met and whether ecocide is a useful frame.

Israel

According to Korea Times reporting, Israel's Foreign Ministry accused Erdoğan of using the COP31 platform to advance anti-Israel claims. Israel's general legal position, as set out in its public statements, is that it acts in self-defense after the attacks of 7 October 2023. It argues that Hamas embeds military assets in civilian areas, which complicates the assessment of harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure. It disputes the jurisdiction of the ICC, since Israel is not a party to the Rome Statute, and it contests the characterization of its conduct. Israel's reply does not, in the reporting reviewed, engage the environmental findings in detail, and readers should weigh that gap.

UN bodies

UNEP's 2025 assessment is the central environmental document. OCHA publishes humanitarian situation reporting, and the UN Secretary-General has called for access and civilian protection. These sources document conditions and needs. They are not criminal findings, and none of them uses 'ecocide' as a legal conclusion.

Legal scholars and NGOs

Supporters of a crime of ecocide argue that current thresholds leave gaps and that a dedicated offence would deter large-scale environmental destruction. Critics argue that the term lacks precision, that the Rome Statute threshold is demanding, and that an advocacy label can blur the line between documented damage and proven criminal conduct. Readers should check each brief's methodology and funding disclosures.

The COP31 process

Under the hosting arrangement explained in Who Runs COP31? How the Antalya Hosting Arrangement Divides Roles Between Türkiye and Australia, negotiations are conducted among Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Conflict-related environmental harm is contested inside that forum because it touches humanitarian law, security and sovereignty, which negotiators do not designate as core climate issues.

Can a climate summit address armed conflict?

A climate conference can host speeches, side events and statements that link war to environmental and humanitarian harm. Legal determinations about war crimes, however, belong to courts with jurisdiction over the facts and parties. Whether such issues belong on the COP31 agenda is itself a matter of debate, and the reporting on Erdoğan's speech does not show a formal negotiating decision.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

According to the Presidency's text of Erdoğan's COP31 address and statements from the Directorate of Communications, Ankara frames damage to farmland, water systems, cities and shelters in Gaza as a humanitarian and environmental catastrophe. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) calls for unhindered humanitarian access and a lasting ceasefire, and links these demands to the Geneva Conventions and UN General Assembly resolutions.

• Environmental and humanitarian framing: Ankara argues that the destruction of farmland, water systems and shelters is a humanitarian and environmental catastrophe that belongs in a climate forum. The primary sources are the Presidency's text of the COP31 address and Directorate of Communications statements. Readers should verify the wording against the official transcript, which this article has not reproduced.
• Access and ceasefire: Türkiye calls for unhindered humanitarian access and a lasting ceasefire, as stated in MFA statements and in its statements at the UN General Assembly and Security Council. Ankara's reference point is Article 59 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which obliges an occupying power to agree to relief schemes for a population inadequately supplied. Israel disputes that Gaza is occupied in its current legal form, and readers should weigh that dispute.
• Two-state solution and recognition: Türkiye supports a two-state solution on the 1967 lines with East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine, and recognized the State of Palestine in 1988, according to MFA positions. These positions rest on the UN Charter principles of sovereign equality and peaceful settlement of disputes.
• Humanitarian diplomacy: Türkiye describes aid shipments and diplomatic efforts through the MFA and the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD). This article does not reproduce figures from those agencies, and readers should take current numbers from their own publications. More on this position is available in the Türkiye Gaza diplomacy position guide.
• Legal accountability and the Rome Statute: Ankara supports accountability through the ICJ and UN processes. According to MFA sources, Türkiye filed a declaration of intervention in the ICJ genocide case brought by South Africa, reported as taking place in 2025; the exact filing date should be confirmed on the ICJ docket. Türkiye is not a party to the Rome Statute. It has long cited concerns about the Court's jurisdictional reach over nationals of non-party states and about state sovereignty. The current MFA wording should be checked before quotation.

Source Comparison

Wire reports such as the Korea Times present 'ecocide' as the speaker's characterization, while Israel's Foreign Ministry treats the speech as political. UNEP describes damage, NGO briefs argue for or against a legal category, and Turkish primary sources state official policy. None of the sources reviewed establishes that a court has found ecocide.

Source	How it uses 'ecocide'	What it can establish	What it cannot establish
Korea Times and wire services (reporting of 11 November 2026)	Quotes 'ecocide' as Erdoğan's word within a news report	That the speech was delivered, its main themes and Israel's reaction	The legal status of the term or the full transcript
Israeli Foreign Ministry response	Rejects the speech as promoting anti-Israel claims	Israel's objection to the framing and its general legal position	A factual rebuttal of the environmental findings, which the reporting does not show
UNEP 2025 assessment	Descriptive environmental language, with no legal characterization as ecocide	Categories and extent of documented damage, within the limits of its methods	Intent, attribution or criminal responsibility
NGO legal briefs	Advocacy for a crime of ecocide, or analysis of the Rome Statute threshold	Legal arguments and definitional debates	Binding findings; they are scholarship or advocacy
Presidency and Directorate of Communications	Erdoğan's characterization within a humanitarian and environmental frame	Türkiye's official framing and statements	Independent verification of the damage
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Official policy lines on access, ceasefire, two states and the Rome Statute	Türkiye's stated positions	Independent facts on the ground

The central distinction is between documented damage and legal characterization. UNEP can document damage to land and water; whether that damage amounts to a war crime, or to ecocide if the term were codified, requires legal findings on scale, duration, intent and proportionality that no descriptive report can provide. Readers should consult the full Korea Times report and the Presidency transcript, since this article relies on reporting for the speech's wording.

For broader context on the trade-offs between humanitarian and legal framing, see Editorial Principles and Primary Source Standards and Fact Check: Common Claims About Türkiye in International Media. Sister analyses also address the subject: Archive of Nations: 'The World Is Bigger Than Five': Türkiye's UN Reform, Gaza Humanitarian and COP31 Diplomacy, Politics of Nations: Türkiye and Gaza: What Ankara's Humanitarian Diplomacy Asks of Other Nations and The State Papers: Gaza and Palestine: Türkiye's Humanitarian Diplomacy and Official Position.

Key Terms & Related Guides

The key terms below are used in this article. Their definitions reflect the instruments cited above, and none of them is a finding that a court has applied to Gaza.

• Ecocide: A proposed crime covering severe environmental destruction. It is not in force under the Rome Statute.
• 'Widespread, long-term and severe': The cumulative threshold in Additional Protocol I, Articles 35(3) and 55. All three elements are required, and the threshold is set high.
• Proportionality: The principle that expected incidental harm, including to the environment, must not be clearly excessive compared with the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
• UNEP post-conflict environmental assessment: A desk and remote-sensing review that describes environmental damage. It is descriptive, not a judicial finding.
• Dolus specialis: The specific intent required for genocide. It is a separate standard from the knowledge elements of environmental war crimes.
• Rome Statute Article 8(2)(b)(iv): The war crime of intentionally launching an attack knowing it will cause widespread, long-term and severe environmental damage clearly excessive relative to the military advantage anticipated.

Related guides on this site include:

• Türkiye Gaza diplomacy position: humanitarian role and the two-state policy
• COP31 Antalya Türkiye climate diplomacy and the Zero Waste initiative
• Who Runs COP31? How the Antalya Hosting Arrangement Divides Roles Between Türkiye and Australia
• UN Security Council Reform: What 'The World Is Bigger Than Five' Means
• About Interstate Journal: Mission, Transparency and Editorial Team

Interstate Journal presents global affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources.

Interstate Journal Editorial Team